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Discursive Construction of National and Political Identities in China:  
Political and Cultural Construction of the Chinese Nation 
 
Qing Cao 
Durham University 
 
 
 Introduction   
 
This chapter examines the discursive formations, features and strategies of identities 
in modern China, focusing on the notions of nation and politics.1 It discusses the origins, 
development and functions of China’s multiple identities and how the circulation of identity 
discourse interacts with broader socio-political processes and shapes the understanding of 
Chinese identities amidst China’s ascent as a major power. Identity is understood as being 
continually constructed and reproduced through discourse that mediates the relationships 
between social practice, institutions and values. It argues that the historical legacy of the 
sharp break with the past in the early twentieth century created an identity crisis generated 
conflicting visions for the future and perennial political struggles to realise these visions. 
National and political identities have been at the heart of these visions and struggles as 
identity politics became the primary domain of the nation- and state-building that constitutes 
the core of China’s quest for modernity. Seeking moral high ground and political legitimacy, 
these visions and struggles are played out in the symbolic world of discourse that are no less 
fierce than the physical world of politics.   
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Drawing largely on Fairclough’s idea of discourse as a social action (Fairclough, 
1992), this chapter conceptualises identity discourse as a principal instrument to mediate, 
manage and shape profound social changes in modern China. It examines the role of 
discourse in moulding specific understandings of society by developing novel ideologies at 
crucial historical junctures. The focus of analysis is placed on what Fairclough (1992:96) 
calls ‘discursive change’ that leads to social change in a dialectical relationship between 
orders of discourse and orders of society. Examining identity discourse offers a unique 
vantage point in revealing macro sociohistorical problems that China has been confronted 
with in modern times. The investigation follows a broad chronological order. First, it 
discusses the great break with traditions as historical conditions that gives rise to the problem 
of modern identity. It highlights the impact of transforming a traditional empire into a 
modern nation-state on the sense of identity crisis that sparked competing ideologies and 
political rivalries as discursive struggles for a viable route to modernity. The analysis then 
moves to the complexities of national identity discourse as formulated, negotiated and 
communicated from the 1911 Xinhai Revolution to the post-1978 economic reforms. The 
discursive battles between the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
are underlined as an interplay of nation-building and identity politics. This is followed by a 
case study of the 2017 CCP National Congress Report to illustrate the latest cultural turn of 
identity through nationalism as a fresh discourse of reinventing the CCP as a loyal heir to 
China’s ancient civilisation. The chapter concludes with a discussion of identity discourse as 
a dynamic historical process.  
  
Historical conditions of identity discourse 
 
The great break and epistemological shift 
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To understand the dynamics of the formation, communication and contestations of national 
and political identities and their discourses, it is crucial to appreciate key historical conditions 
that created China’s identity dilemmas. Intrinsically linked to China as a unique civilisation, 
these conditions embody the fundamental problems inherent in modern identity politics. 
Gellner (2006: xxiv) argues that identity is based primarily on culture. When culture shifts, 
identity shifts. The arrival of industrialism in European societies precipitated a rapid 
transformation of identity in the transition from traditional to modern way of life. China 
experienced a double transition in early twentieth century – from an agrarian to industrial 
society and from a traditional indigenous to modern western epistemology. Identity problems 
became even more intense in China. The first transition occurred in the physical world of 
reorganising the state system and interstate relations; the second in the symbolic world of 
discourse that guides the physical transformation. The double transition however arose 
abruptly as a defensive mechanism to meet external challenges posed by Western powers. 
Imperial China (221BC–1911) as the world’s longest and only surviving ancient empire in 
the early twentieth century was forced to transmute into a modern ‘nation-state’ in the 1911 
Xinhai Revolution that dismantled the millennia-old imperial order.  
The nineteenth-century Western colonial encroachments also triggered a sense of 
cultural inferiority that convinced the Chinese elites of the imperative of adopting not only 
Western political structure of nation-state, but its epistemological system of modern 
knowledge to restructure the understanding of society radically different from China’s own 
(Cao, 2017a). An entirely new set of discourse about the nature of the state, nation and 
society began to emerge prominently in the modern press promoted by intellectual leaders 
such as Liang Qichao. Empires, ancient or modern, rose and fell, but the Chinese empire 
went through only cycles of dynastic change.  Built on a long tradition of civilisation, the 
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Chinese empire was sustained by a Confucian belief system with a centralised bureaucracy.  
But in a short period of time between the 1895 defeat of China’s maritime war with Japan 
and the 1911 Xinhai Revolution, this belief system was largely swept away in a momentous 
epistemological shift. Western ideas, institutions and values that were introduced to China 
became widely accepted among the literate class. The new form of modern knowledge 
became a dominant mode of discourse that rapidly altered the traditional way of thinking and 
created a break with China’s intellectual traditions, parallel to the break with the traditional 
form of state and government. The double break set off fervent attempts by diverse political 
forces to construct new national and political identities shaped by a multiplicity of 
perceptions and outlooks inspired by the fresh epistemological system.  
Crucially, related to the double transformation is an entirely new set of vocabularies 
that entered the Chinese language during this period of time to express new practices, 
institutions and values. These vocabularies that encode the western episteme constitute the 
fibric of a new mode of modernity-based discourse. Facilitated by fresh terminologies, such a 
discourse acquired an exclusionary nature of segregation and rejection from its inception. It 
operates in a dichotomous fashion to discursively segregate the past with the present,  
rendering traditional epistemology irrelevant in the discussion of solutions to the present 
problems and visions of the future. In a similar vein, it rejects the past either through 
nonrecognition or attacks on traditions. The rise of the exclusionary modernity discourse in 
its many facets emerged with new generations of scholars frustrated with China’s 
predicaments. One significant group who contributed substantially to the rise of new 
modernity-related vocabularies are returning Chinese students from Japan. The majority of 
new vocabularies are Japanese Kanji (Chinese characters in the Japanese language) in origin 
that are used in translating Western books into Japanese in the late nineteenth century. 
Brought back from Japan by returning students, these new words became a significant 
5 
 
addition to the Chinese language. Most are nouns that express a (western) concept, or abstract 
nouns. As a result, large amounts of terminologies in modern Chinese about politics, 
economy, society, science, art and literature are Western in origin. It is in this sense that 
Levenson contends that the West changed China ‘with a new language’, through which 
foreign ideas displaced domestic ones. That is, rather than broadening Chinese culture with 
linguistic enrichment, the new language ‘removed Chinese culture to another plane’ 
(Levenson 1968: 161). Currently, over 30% of Chinese words emerged since the late Qing 
period; most are concept nouns from the West. More than 70% vocabulary in any piece of 
modern political text consists of terms from abroad (Wang 1980: 516). Indeed, the new 
language created a new system of (western) knowledge that underpins all prevalent modern 
discourses, including Marxism. In other words, it created a new ‘conceptual map’ (Hall 1997) 
through which fresh identities are developed, circulated and reproduced. Table 1 shows three 
lists of typical modern terminologies introduced into China as Japanese Kanji around the turn 
of the twentieth century.  
 
                        Table 1: Western concepts translated into Kanji in Japan  
No. Culture  Politics Nation  
1 文化 culture  政治 politics 民族 nation  
2 文明 civilisation  共和 republic  民族主义 nationalism  
3 文学 literature  革命 revolution  主权 sovereignty  
4 艺术 art 民主 democracy  国民性 national character  
5 哲学 philosophy  共产主义 communism  国家 state 
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6 美学 aesthetics  自由 liberty  世界观 worldview  
7 认知 cognition  阶级 class 殖民地 colony  
8 主观 subjectivity 权利 right 治外法权 extraterritoriality  
9 表象 representation  法律 law  领土 territory  
10 批评 criticism  民权 civil rights 帝国主义 imperialism  
 
 
Identity, discourse and social change  
 
Identity is a sense of who we are, including our beliefs and values. It involves a sense of 
belonging to a group, either ethnic, racial and cultural, or linguistic and national. Erikson 
(1959: 27–8) defines identity as a mutual relation – it connotes a persistent sameness within 
oneself while sharing some characteristics with others. It highlights the historical conditions 
that heighten a national sense of identity rather than a static national character (Erikson 1968: 
198). Dittmer and Kim however emphasise the role of the state in identity formation, arguing 
that a nation is not simply ‘the largest and most inclusive form of collective identity’, it is 
subject to state authority in a modern ‘nation-state’ (Dittmer and Kim 1993: 6). Identity is a 
cultural construction that is fluid, adaptive and changing. It becomes crucial for individuals, 
groups and nations in troubled times because the sense of identity is often aroused by crisis as 
discussed above. A nation always redefines its identity when challenged or corroded as a 
process of adaptation in restoring an equilibrium between traditions and challenges. 
However, it is through discourse that identities are formulated, articulated and communicated 
with a cultural group. As a mode of representation as well as social action, discourse has a 
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dialectical relationship with social structures. Discourse is shaped and constrained by social 
structures, while simultaneously constituting them (Fairclough 1992: 64). This is what 
Foucault (1972) postulates as discursive formation of objects, subjects and concepts that 
organise our understanding and actions in dealing with the external world. Discourse not only 
represents the world, it constructs it. Much like Europe since the eighteenth century, 
discourse on national identity played a key role in nation- and state-building in twentieth-
century China.  
The key moment of China’s redefining national identity began with its transformation 
from a universalist ‘all-under-heaven’ to a specific multi-ethnic nation-state - ‘the Republic 
of China’ (ROC, 1912) and later ‘the People’s Republic of China’ (PRC). However, the 
forced metamorphosis created an anomaly described by Lucian Pye (1992: 235) as a 
‘civilisation-state’ disguised as a nation-state. A civilisation-state is based on the power of 
culture, in contrast to a nation-state built on a nation as a group of people. The anomaly arose 
from the contrived nature of the Chinese nation-state as a ‘manufacture’, rather than as a 
natural historical growth. Its expedient character as a survival strategy forebodes innate 
contradictions, ambiguities and paradoxes in national identity. To catch up with the West, 
Chinese elites hastened to abandon their traditions to experiment with novel values and 
institutions in what the historian Yu Ying-shih (1993: 141) calls ‘a ‘neoterist mentality – a 
mentality obsessed with change, with what is new’. The collapse of the traditional order and a 
constant search for new tools to amass wealth and power determines the transformative 
nature of identity discourse. Transformative discourse emerges to copes with rapid social 
changes and identity crisis. It is oriented towards innovation and drastic actions, invents new 
social structures and develops new power relations (Fairclough 1989: 37–9). The imperative 
to create new cultural self and relations with others obliged Chinese elites to radically alter 
their conventional thinking. New frames of reference and vocabularies have become the 
8 
 
primary repertoire to produce inventive identity discourses. Such discourses (analysed below) 
are typified by a constant struggle for change rather than sustaining continuity. Driven by a 
catch-up mentality, the struggle is played out by fighting for the right to define, defend and 
lead the nation for survival and to an eventual triumph. The discourses are also characterised 
by strategic and communicative modes of communication (Habermas 1984). The strategic 
discourse is oriented towards Chinese nation-state building; while the communicative 
discourse operates to achieve consensus-building for popular support and solidarity.  
 
Constructing the ‘nation’: discourse of nationalism and national identity  
 
Discourse of the nation  
 
As a territorial community, a nation is understood as a population united by a common 
descent, history, culture or language. But this notion is a modern European invention as 
Hobsbawm (1990) and Gellner (2006) have argued. Highlighting its constructive nature, 
Hobsbawm (1990: 20) contends that ‘if the nation had anything in common from the popular-
revolutionary point of view, it was not, in any fundamental sense, ethnicity, language and the 
like, though these could be indications of collective belonging’. Similarly, Gellner (2006) 
defines nationalism as a function of modernity – it is nationalism that produces nations rather 
than the other way around. For Gellner, nation and nationalism are consequences of European 
industrialism. ‘Nation’ (民族) as a new term first appeared in China in 1837 in Eastern 
Western Monthly Magazine (东西洋考每月统纪传) to describe the Israeli people. However, 
in the next six decades it was only used 13 times until 1895 when China was defeated in the 
Jiawu maritime war with  Japan. A sharp rise occurred in the use of ‘nation’ since 1895 as a 
novel concept of interstate relations in the post-war crisis. Liang Qichao coined the term 
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‘China nation’ (中国民族) in 1901, but a year later he changed it to the ‘Chinese nation’ (中
华民族) – a term that has been used to this day. Trying to instigate fundamental changes in a 
‘stagnant’ society, Liang Qichao and Sun Yet-san believed it was critical to develop a sense 
of nation to forge a collective solidarity against external aggression.  
However, the idea of ‘nation’ is alien to imperial China that saw itself as the centre of 
the world in a universalist view of ‘all-under-heaven’ (天下). In the Sinocentric world, the 
centre of huaxia (华夏 China) and the periphery of yi (夷 barbarians) are defined culturally 
rather than ethnically. The empire expanded or contracted in accordance with its cultural 
influence, though backed by military power. Steeped in Western modernity and interstate 
politics, the idea of ‘nation’ rarely registered in the Chinese mind.  ‘民’ and ‘族’ as two 
separate Chinese characters in the translation of ‘nation’ conjure up meanings embedded in 
traditional epistemology. ‘民’ indicates people in the four categories of scholars, farmers, 
artisans and merchants, while ‘族’ refers to extended families or clans. Conscious of the 
challenges of promoting the idea of ‘nation’, Sun Yat-sen lamented: ‘there is no nationalism 
in China but familism and clannism. Foreign observers see the Chinese as a heap of loose 
sand . . . Chinese unity is limited only to the clan and has never been extended to the nation’2 
(Sun 1924: 1). To develop a collective ‘imagined community’ (Anderson 1983) of the 
Chinese nation, the political elites underscored the discourse of national survival, revival and 
prosperity to enhance cohesiveness among the people and loyalty to the nation. Serving the 
‘nation’ constitutes the core legitimising discourse for political, sociocultural and economic 
campaigns, including those that are ideologically coloured. The industrialist discourse of 
wealth and power has become a dominant mode of talking about the nation. The spirituality-
based cultural world has given way to a materiality-defined political world of nation-state 
that determines significantly the discursive structure of national identities.  
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Strands of nationalism discourse 
 
Since the emergency of national consciousness in the late nineteenth century, nationalism has 
become the rallying call for sociopolitical and cultural campaigns. Different strands of 
nationalist discourse arose in different contexts with different objectives, but most are 
politically motivated. Different forms of nationalism have been enmeshed with diverse 
political as well as cultural forces to mobilise the public for a particular understanding of the 
national situation. The discourses they produce focus principally on national identities and 
political tasks required to deal with nation-building. Drawing largely on diverse modernity-
based sources,  each strand highlights a particular element of western intellectual tradition in 
constructing its argument. Four types of nationalism, however, have become significant over 
the last century in shaping the way that the nation is understood and promoted. 
 
Ethnic nationalism  
Ethnic nationalism is the earliest form that arose around the turn into the twentieth century as 
a response to the Manchu rulers’ failure to resist Western imperialism. Seeing Manchus as an 
alien non-Chinese regime, late Qing revolutionaries argued for an ethnic revolution to 
remove the Manchus as a first step to establish a modern republic. Articulated as the first of 
the ‘three peoples’ principles’ – (ethnic) nationalism - the revolutionaries imagined the 
Chinese nation as consisting of Han Chinese as the basis of a modern nation-state. The Han 
ethnic identity was inspired by social Darwinism promoted by the cultural elites to awaken 
their compatriots from centuries of Manchu rule. This divisive nationalism on ethnic grounds 
however was quickly replaced by an inclusive ‘five-ethnicity republic’ (五族共和) based on 
shared historical experiences. The ‘multi-ethnic nation’ aimed to bind together the Han, 
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Manchus, Mongols, Huis and Tibetans to convert the Qing empire into a modern nation-state. 
Within the ethnic-political project, the majority Han gained state power and incorporated all 
ethnicities into a ‘big ethnic family’.  
Nonetheless, ethnicity has acquired a different strand of meaning in emphasising a 
common ancestral origin in China of the legendary Yellow Emperor. The Yellow Emperor 
discourse presents the Chinese nation as united by ties of blood, wherein cultural characters 
have become secondary to ethnic specificity. Membership of the nation is ascribed in terms 
of congenital endowment. The discourse of patrilineal descent has therefore become a 
cohesive device of national identity construction. Such an emotive discourse is capable of 
transcending religious, linguistic and regional differences in forging a shared sense of 
Chineseness. The Yanhuang (Emperors Yan and Huang) descendants discourse suggests a 
familial bond and kinship. Ethnicity-defined Chineseness has been at the heart of the 
communicative discourse aimed particularly at developing a sense of commonality in 
Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macau and the expanding overseas Chinese communities. In contrast to 
the early narrow ethnicity-defined nationalist discourse, the familial bond strand of ethnicity 
moves to the symbolic world to enhance the sense of Chineseness at a global scale.  
 
Liberal nationalism 
Inspired by Western liberal ideas of individual rights, early twentieth-century intellectuals 
imagined a strong nation-state as comprising free individuals united in their political values 
in opposing external aggression and internal arbitrary rule. Enthused by democratic ideals, 
liberal nationalists campaigned for civil liberty and political accountability. Critical of the 
Kuomintang government’s authoritarian rule, they were sympathetic to and at times allied 
with the communists to fight for democracy. Purged in the post-1949 Maoist campaigns, they 
regrouped in the reform period to push for democratic changes. Liberal nationalism is similar 
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to what Hutchinson (1987: 12–13) calls ‘political nationalism’ that transcends ethnic and 
cultural differences in anticipation of a common humanity. Liberal discourse of nationalism 
inherited the spirit of the late Qing revolutionaries and the 1919 May Fourth Movement 
activists in advocating ‘democracy and science’ as universal values. The May Fourth has 
become a primary repertoire from which later liberal nationalists drew their inspirations. 
The 1980s witnessed a ‘golden age’ of the liberal discourse when Western humanities 
and social sciences were introduced to China after three decades of prohibition. It coincided 
with the ‘liberal period’ of the CCP under general secretaries Hu Yaobang (1982–87) and 
Zhao Ziyang (1987–89), both removed from post for their liberal stance towards popular 
demands for anti-corruption and political accountability. The liberal discourse focused on a 
vision of China as the emancipation of individuals within the nation-state. The state was 
envisaged as a protector and guarantor of individual freedom, in addition to nationalist 
aspirations of wealth and power. However, the undercurrent of criticism of the authoritarian 
rule was apparent though tolerated by the then liberal CCP leaders. The liberal 1980s 
resembled the 1910s in their vision of ‘salvaging the Chinese nation’ by embracing liberalism 
as an emancipating project. To liberal nationalists, individual emancipation was not only 
compatible with national prosperity, but vital to achieve it. The liberal discourse has 
remained a constant force for progressive change - its most recent exponent includes Yu 
Keping, author of the acclaimed book Democracy is a Good Thing.  
 
Cultural nationalism  
With the exception of few conservatives like Kang Youwei and Liu Shipei, late Qing 
intellectuals saw traditions as impeding China’s progress and needing to be eradicated. From 
the 1910s May Fourth radicalism to the 1980s anti-traditionalism, Chinese culture was the 
constant target of criticism. However, cultural nationalism emerged in the academia in the 
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late 1980s and flourished in the 1990s amidst diminishing revolutionary discourse and as the 
backlash of the 1980s ‘romanticisation of the West’. Regarding traditional culture as the 
foundation of nation-building, many scholars redefined national identity in a discourse of 
‘cultural Chineseness’. It refers to dominant values rooted in pre-Qin classics and their 
prevailing interpretations over two millennia. Anchored in a traditional epistemological 
frame, cultural nationalists rejected the Marxist interpretation of Chinese history, and saw it 
as a natural evolution from early civilisation maturing in the pre-Qin era, only to be 
vandalised in modern revolutionary campaigns. They argued nation-building should be based 
on the restoration of Confucianism and its adaptation to modern conditions. The traditional 
culture resurgence constitutes what some scholars call ‘a Confucian renaissance’ (Guo 2004). 
A key tenet of its discourse regards the Chinese nation as more than a political construct but 
endowed with a unique civilisation that should be treasured and revitalised. For them, 
China’s most pressing problem resides not in economic development or political 
liberalisation, but in regaining the ‘national spirit’: ‘over a billion souls were deprived of a 
spiritual guidance and wander aimlessly’ (Jiang 1989: 64). Following the footsteps of ‘new 
Confucianists’ like Xiong Shili, Liang Shuming and Zhang Junmai, they reject imported 
Marxism and its application to Chinese history and society. The discourse has spread to 
various academic disciplines including history, linguistics, art and literature. Significantly, 
cultural nationalism has gradually entered official discourse of state nationalism in the 
twenty-first century.  
 
State nationalism 
State nationalism has been a dominant form since the Xinhai Revolution. It is characterised 
by a focus on the nation-state as a political-territorial unit and an organisational system. 
Inheriting the imperial legacy of investing immense power in the state, political elites 
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including the KMT and CCP emphasised a powerful state as an effective agency against 
external as well as internal threats. Regarding the state as having the ultimate responsibility 
of safeguarding national sovereignty, territorial integrity and national revival, all political 
parties rely on their nationalist credentials for political legitimacy. Highlighting its historical 
role of creating the PRC state, the CCP not only oversees the functioning of the state but 
defines what constitutes ‘national interests’ and how they are best served. The discourse of a 
powerful state under a party supervision was inherited directly from the KMT that created the 
party-state system. However, the CCP’s patriotism discourse has extended state nationalism 
further; patriotism has become a key discursive mechanism through which the party-state 
determines the ‘correct’ forms and acts of nationalism. Through top-down campaigns, 
patriotism aims to achieve social consensus on specific versions of nationalism in a specific 
sociopolitical condition. The carefully executed discourse regulates the thinking and 
behaviours of the general public. Its key role lies in the CCP’s power to define the 
relationship between individuals and the nation-state. In the post-reform era, its added 
importance arose when the CCP’s legitimacy shifted from a socialist equality to economic 
performance. Patriotic education facilitated the transition by redefining the CCP’s political 
identity from an ideology-inspired socialism to nationalism-focused developmentalism. It not 
only enhanced a sense of belonging to the Chinese nation, but de-ideologized the market as a 
neutral tool to organise economic life. Patriotism discourse functions largely as a mechanism 
of regulating the CCP-defined political boundaries in the rapid changing post-reform society. 
 
Political identities as a struggle for the nation  
 
Discursive struggles for the nation are constituted by the daily operations of politics. Politics 
could be defined as allocation of resources, arguably for the collective good. It involves 
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obtaining, exercising and maintaining power for the control of resources. To maximise 
consent and minimise coercion, political power needs to be legitimate – the right and 
acceptance of the authority of power-holders. Legitimacy is fundamental to social stability by 
reducing violent competition for power. In imperial China, the emperor’s legitimacy derived 
from the ‘mandate of heaven’. The cosmic-based legitimacy stamped out challenges to 
imperial power, and discredited rebellions as perverse. The post-imperial competition for 
political power focuses on the idea of nation-state building, centring on new identities and 
institutions. Critical to the process is managing the gap between imported political ideologies 
and the realities of an agrarian society.  
 
The discourse of revolution: the rise of radicalism   
 
Determined to bring about modern change, Chinese elites of all ideological persuasions 
embraced the idea of revolution. The twentieth century as ‘a century of revolution’ 
transformed China from the world’s most conservative society to one of the most radical. It 
started from the ‘Xinhai Revolution’ (1911) and ‘Second Revolution’ (1913) through the 
‘New Democratic Revolution’ (1911–49) and ‘Nationalist Revolution’ (1924–27) to the 
‘Land Revolution’ (1927–37), ‘Socialist Revolution’ (1949–56) and eventually ‘Cultural 
Revolution’ (1966–76). Waged between opposing ideologies, political struggles went through 
three phases, each is characterised by a tension between a radical transformation and 
incremental reform. The first phase started in late Qing when ‘conservatives’ Kang Youwei 
and Liang Qichao campaigned for a constitutional monarchy as opposed to a revolution led 
by Sun Yet-san to establish a modern republic. The victory of the revolutionary publication 
Minbao over the monarchist Xinmin congbao in the 1905–07 press debate contributed to the 
fall of the Qing empire, but it also set in motion a chain of radical events in the following 
16 
 
decades. The second phase consists of the epic rivalry between the KMT with a vision of a 
democratic future, and the CCP with a socialist China. In claiming political legitimacy, each 
defined and defended itself as an exclusive champion of the Chinese nation. Each constructed 
a compelling narrative to bolster their military campaigns. It is in this sense that Mao sees the 
pen (propaganda) as powerful as the gun (army).  
The third phase comprises the intra-CCP conflict between radical and moderate forms 
of socialism. The Maoist period (1949–76) saw the triumph of socialist radicalism over 
pragmatic gradualism. Under Maoist ‘continuous revolution’ discourse, China endured the 
most turbulent and destructive period in modern history. The impatience to achieve socialist 
miracles revealed the same thirst for radical change in the late Qing period. Utopian socialism 
resonated with the passionate promotion of the modern nation-state in the 1906–7 epic 
debate. The hegemonic discourse reverberated with the dominant mode of a binary 
representation of the society. It pitted modernity against tradition, the new against the old, 
and novelty against convention. ‘Progress’ was defined as a relentless quest for what is 
‘advanced’. In the post-reform China however, the ideological fervour subsided in a shift to 
economic development, though the radicalism vs. gradualism tension lingers on. 
Like most modern terminologies, ‘revolution’ as a novel concept was introduced to 
late imperial China. Capturing the imagination of the elites eager to pursue modernity, the 
term gained an immediate currency in China. Translated in Chinese as革命, the linkage 
between ‘revolution’ and the two Chinese characters ‘革命’ is far from straightforward. ‘革
命’ as a term first appeared in zhouyi (周易) in the Western Zhou period (1066–771BC), 
referring to the change of dynasty. Tang and Wu (two kings) toppled the savage rulers Jie 
and Zhou in the name of the ‘mandate of heaven’.  However, the original sense of a cyclical 
dynastic change acquired a modern meaning embedded in the political ideology of the French 
and American revolutions. No longer a rebellion against the imperial authority, 革命 brings 
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down an ancien régime for an advanced political institution. Though Western in origin, 革命 
was a Japanese translation in Kanji. Brought to China by returning students, the term 
delighted ethnic nationalists determined to topple the minority Manchu rulers. 革命 provided 
them with an added legitimacy in seeing ‘foreign’ Manchus as ‘ancien régime’. Adding to the 
heat of the revolution discourse was the publication of the 1903 booklet Revolutionary Army 
by Zou Rong (1885–1905) that fuelled further public support for revolution. 
 
The discourse of left and right 
 
Battles for political identity have created the Chinese left and right. Like the rise of these 
terms during the American and French revolutions, the Chinese left and right arose in the 
Xinghai Revolution. Many concepts and arguments that defined Chinese politics entered the 
scene in the early twentieth century. Unlike the West however, political divisions in China 
were far deeper and more violent. Conservatism as political right was largely disparaged 
during the Xinghai Revolution and has acquired a stigma of ‘reactionary’ or ‘anti-
revolutionary’. Associated with ‘backward’, ‘feudal’ and ‘closed-minded’, political right 
connoted resistance to progressive change. Political left however gained an image of being 
‘enlightened’ and ‘advanced’. Being revolutionary parties, the KMT and CCP shared some 
common ground in rejecting traditional polity and fighting for national independence, though 
offering different futures. Guided by Sun Yet-san’s ‘three peoples’ principles’ of nationalism, 
democracy and people’s livelihood, the KMT envisaged an eventual liberal democracy 
through a nationalist revolution. Rejecting it as a ‘capitalist democracy’, the CCP offered 
instead to remove ‘three mountains’ on the back of China – imperialism, feudalism and 
comprador capitalism. The ‘three peoples’ vs ‘three mountains’ divide precipitated a life and 
death struggle between the capitalist ‘right’ and the socialist ‘left’ for political power. 
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Rejecting the KMT three-step ‘military, supervisory and constitutional government’ as the 
‘old democratic revolution’, the CCP promised to propel China into a post-capitalist socialist 
utopia. Both parties created a compelling discourse to articulate their identities based on 
opposing political ideologies.  
The left vs right battle did not conclude with the KMT’s monumental defeat. In the 
post- 1949 China, the battle continued in a new mode but with disastrous consequences. In 
the Maoist era, moderate leaders were branded as ‘rightists’. Intra-party campaigns purged 
millions from the CCP. ‘Line struggles’ as the ideological disciplinary machine imposed 
‘correct’ political and ideological identities. Orthodox socialism achieved much of its 
objective of creating an egalitarian society in urban areas, with profound human costs. To 
resolve the command economy’s efficiency problem, a market socialism was introduced in 
the post-1978 China. The deadly left vs right struggle subsided into a neutral discourse of 
economic development. Transcending the capitalism vs socialism divide, the ideological 
ambiguity facilitated market reform and economic growth. Nonetheless, the intra-party 
ideological rivalry resulted in the removal of the ‘right-leaning’ CCP leaders Hu Yaobang 
and Zhao Ziyang. 
In the post-Tiananmen China, the left/right divide has taken to a different domain – an 
intellectual debate under the watchful eye of the authorities with few policy implications. The 
party-state has united in its pro-business policy under an economic ‘neoliberalism’ (Harvey 
2007). Emerging in the 1990s, the ‘new left’ arose in criticising international capitalist 
exploitation of Chinese workers. Armed with Western ‘new left’ theories, they represented a 
critique of capitalism in China that contributed to the widening gap between rich and poor. 
They focused on state ownership and argued for its greater role in improving social justice. 
However, the left/right discourse was overshadowed by developmentalism (Cao 2017b). The 
nebulous early-stage socialism faded into the background against the CCP’s fresh identity 
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based on the materialist thrust of industrial modernity, resembling the late Qing self-
strengthening movement.  
 
Changing national and political identities: a case study of the CCP 2017 Report 
 
With four decades of economic success, the CCP has oriented its identity towards cultural 
nationalism. The importance of traditional culture started to appear official discourse in the 
2000s when the CCP reinstated the Confucian value of ‘people as the basis’ (民本) to 
underpin their policies. However, it is in the Party’s external communication that culture was 
highlighted as constituting China’s ‘soft power’. Articulated in the 2007 CCP Seventeenth 
Congress Report, soft power was accorded a strategic importance in engaging in international 
competition. Enhancing the appeal of Chinese civilisation drives much of China’s external 
communication efforts including setting up Confucian Institutes around the world. A shift 
occurred in the 2017 CCP Nineteenth Congress from external-directed ‘soft power’ to 
internal-focused ‘national rejuvenation’ (民族复兴). Soft power as part of ‘comprehensive 
national power’ is extended to embrace a ‘national revival’. Both strands share the same 
communicative purpose of enhancing national cohesion, identity and solidarity, in addition to 
the CCP’s political legitimacy. The 2017 Congress Report subsumes the CCP’s political 
identity under cultural nationalism in an ‘original aspiration’ (初心) discourse. It interweaves 
the Party’s history with a national journey of salvation and revival. The report opens with a 
party mission statement (Xi 2017): ‘The original aspiration and mission of Chinese 
Communists are to seek happiness for the Chinese people and the rejuvenation of the Chinese 
nation. . . We must keep on striving vigorously toward the great goal of national 
rejuvenation’.3  
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It is significant that ‘national rejuvenation’ occurs 32 times in the report, more than 
the total number of its occurrences in the previous eight congress reports since 1982. In 
contrast to early narratives, the 2017 report presents an upbeat, confident and assertive 
projection of the nation. ‘Today, we have never been more confident, able and closer to 
achieving the objective of realising the great national rejuvenation’ (今天，我们比历史上任
何时期都更接近、更有信心和能力实现中华民族伟大复兴的目标) (Xi 2017). Such a 
narrative intertwines with the ‘Chinese dream’ (中国梦) discourse Xi promoted since 2012 - 
a dream officially interpreted as an aspiration of national revitalisation. Crucially, the report 
elevates culture to the status of ‘national soul’ (民族的灵魂): ‘Culture is the soul of a country 
and nation. . . Socialist culture with Chinese characteristics is derived from China’s fine 
traditional culture born of Chinese civilization nurtured over 5,000 years. . . It has been a 
loyal heir to and promoter of China’s fine traditional culture’ (X 2017). The CCP thus casts 
itself as a guardian and champion of traditional culture. The metaphor erases memories of the 
ideologically inspired ‘anti-feudal’ cultural vandalism. Socialism is thus discursively 
coalesced to traditional values. Its history is streamlined into the progressive phases of 
‘revolution, development and reform’ in a national journey of rebirth, recuperation and 
rejuvenation. Collapsing political and national identity in a single rejuvenation discourse, a 
new brand of cultural nationalism is created. It imagines the nation as based on a distinctive 
civilisation with a unique tradition and history.  
Positioned as cultural nationalists, the CCP accentuates cultural membership through 
national uniqueness and cultural distinction. As such, the organising strategies of nationalism 
are deployed to add nationalist credentials in addition to economic performance. Nonetheless, 
socialism’s symbolic presence gains a ritualistic prominence with its 148 occurrences in the 
report. Its high frequency is nonetheless limited to the naming of current practice as having a 
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socialist nature. Early-stage socialism is tied to a developmentalist discourse substantiated 
with policy details. As the report’s highest frequency term, ‘development’ appears 232 times. 
The narrower focus and circular rhetoric underline the ideological significance of socialism, 
though its discursive structure has been firmly anchored in cultural nationalism and economic 
developmentalism. The CCP leaders have sought to incorporate classical thinking into their 
governing principles. Hu Jintao embraced the Mencian ‘people as priority’ in his 
‘harmonious society’. In addition to highlighting the ‘spiritual homeland’ (精神家园), Xi 
quoted pre-Qin classics in governing styles in his 2014 speech at the CCP politburo study 
session. Xi drew on eight classics including those by Confucius and Mencius.  
 
Identity discourse as a process 
 
Foucault sees discourse as a way of constituting knowledge by producing meanings in the 
symbolic world. Any knowledge however is historically situated and socially contested. It is 
the contestation among groups with different interests that create the dynamics of discursive 
struggles. Situated in a turbulent historical process, China’s identity discourse has undergone 
many shifts and turns. The excruciating process of uprooting millennia-old practices, 
institutions and values gave rise to much of the strife, challenges and dilemmas, as well as the 
drive, determination and aspirations for a new future. The metamorphosis engendered a 
plethora of ideologies, values and institutions among competing political forces to carve out a 
viable route to modernity. Shulman (2002: 559) identified three types of national identity – 
civic, cultural and ethnic. Civic identity is similar to political nationalism discussed by 
Hutchinson. Concerned with equal rights based on a cosmopolitan conception of the nation, 
individuals identify the nation by common laws and mores. This is what late Qing 
intellectuals embraced as post-enlightenment values. Liang Qichao promoted this version of 
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national identity in his Discourse on New Citizen (新民说) first published in his 
newsmagazine Xinmin congbao in the early 1900s. Liang sees an independent citizenry as the 
foundation of nation-building, without which state-building is impossible. Taken up in 
subsequent campaigns, ‘the new citizen’ evolved into a ‘national citizenry’ (国民) discourse. 
Though rekindled in the 1980s, the liberal strand of national identity has been overshadowed 
by state and cultural nationalism. However, with the democratic change in the KMT rule in 
Taiwan, civic identity has grown in the island. Paradoxically, it has posed a challenge to the 
state, and to a lesser extent, cultural nationalism in mainland China as a separate identity 
based on civic consciousness.  
Shulman includes in civic nationalism the constituent elements of citizenship, 
consent, institutions and law’. These dimensions are key to China’s inter- and intra-party 
division, rivalry and struggle. Both the KMT and CCP however have shared state 
nationalism, accentuating state authority in defining national identity. Nonetheless, the KMT 
as the dominant political force fell in Taiwan in ceding to rising civic nationalism. In the 
mainland, state nationalism has nonetheless remained constant and prevalent. Post-reform 
rising living standards and a growing middle class have boosted state rather than civic 
national identity. Grotenhuis (2016: 131) argues the expectation that ideologies and 
institutions imbedded in the West are fit for purpose in local conditions is unrealistic. Robust 
state nationalism could be attributed to China’s imperial tradition and centralised authority. 
The modern state has inherited not only the power structure but a mode of discourse that 
sanctions, legitimises and rationalises that structure. 
Regarded as crucial building blocks, tradition and language are central to Shulman’s 
definition of cultural nationalism. As discussed earlier, Chinese tradition condemned in much 
of the twentieth century has made a comeback in official nationalism.  Its communicative 
value of rallying the public behind the CCP is obvious. However, it is unclear which aspects 
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of traditions will eventually adopt not only in rhetoric but in practice. It is too early to say 
China has come closer to bridging the gap between tradition and modernity. Ancestry and 
race - two central elements in ethnic nationalism - have been pivotal in forging the discourse 
of a shared Chineseness. While largely successful in mainland China, they are less effective 
in Taiwan. Emerging indigenous identity has testified the KMT’s diminishing influence in 
Taiwan as a historical party, but more crucially the complex and fluid nature of identity 
politics.  
A century has elapsed since the fall of the Chinese empire. The political elites have 
embarked on the road of industrial modernity, pushed through by state power. Wealth, power 
and the international standing motivated late imperial reformers and revolutionaries as well as 
those that followed their footsteps. It is perhaps unsurprising that official identity discourses 
have centred on the grand narrative of the state. Even Liang Qichao’s ‘new citizen’ is 
conceived as an instrument to build a powerful modern nation-state. The human dimension of 
modernity as reflected in civic national consciousness and the empowerment and welfare of 
the individual has been overshadowed by the hegemonic official discourses of national 
identity. The road to modernity as a project for the nation-state and the people living in it is 
far from being complete. The discursive struggle for the project continues.  
Notes 
1. The production of this chapter was supported by a UK Arts and Humanities Research Council 
Open  
       World Research Initiative (OWRI) grant. 
2. The translation from Chinese to English is mine. 
3. The translation of this report is based on Xinhua News Agency’s version with minor changes for 
accuracy. 
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